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ABSTRACT
In the U.S., Great Britain, and in many other countries, the gap between the demand and the supply
of human organs for transplantation is on the rise, despite the efforts of governments and health
agencies to promote donor registration. In some countries of continental Europe, however, cadaveric
organ procurement is based on the principle of presumed consent. Under presumed consent
legislation, a deceased individual is classified as a potential donor in absence of explicit opposition
to donation before death. This article analyzes the impact of presumed consent laws on donation
rates. For this purpose, we construct a dataset on organ donation rates and potential factors affecting
organ donation for 22 countries over a 10-year period. We find that while differences in other
determinants of organ donation explain much of the variation in donation rates, after controlling for
those determinants presumed consent legislation has a positive and sizeable effect on organ donation
rates.
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Chronic shortage of human organs for transplantation is one of the most pressing health 
policy issues in many developed countries, including the U.S. and Great Britain. In recent 
years, the persistent scarcity of organs for transplantation has invigorated the controversy 
about the determinants of organ donation rates and the magnitude of their effects. With a 
few exceptions, however, this debate has not been informed by systematic empirical 
studies.
1 
A particularly heated debate has arisen on the matter of legislative defaults on 
cadaveric organ donation. In many countries, including the U.S., Great Britain, Germany 
and Australia, cadaveric organ procurement is carried out under the informed consent 
principle. Under an informed consent law, cadaveric organ extraction requires the explicit 
consent of the donor before death, which is usually reflected on a donor registration card. 
In contrast, in most of continental Europe, cadaveric organ procurement is based on the 
principle of presumed consent. Under presumed consent legislation, a deceased 
individual is classified as a potential donor in absence of explicit opposition to donation 
before death. In practice, regardless of the type of legislation and of whether a deceased 
individual is registered as a donor (or as a non-donor), in most countries families are 
allowed to have the last word on whether organs will be donated. It has been argued, 
however, that legislative defaults affect the decisions of potential donors and families.
2 
This article uses a panel of 22 countries over a 10-year period to analyze the impact of 
presumed consent laws on donation rates. After controlling for other determinants of 
cadaveric organ donation, we find that countries with presumed consent legislation have 
higher organ donation rates. Moreover, we use the panel structure of our database to test 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions are Gimbel et al. (2003) and Johnson and Goldstein (2003). 
2 See Sunstein and Thaler (2003).   2
and reject the hypothesis that unmeasured (additive) determinants of organ donation rates 
confound our empirical results.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the main 
facts highlighted in the previous literature on organ donation. Section III presents a 
simple model that illustrates a way in which legislative defaults may affect organ 
donation rates. The main empirical results of the article are given in section IV. Section V 
concludes. Data sources and technical details are reported in the appendices. 
 
II. The Organ Shortage Problem 
In 2002, 6,679 patients died on the U.S. organ waiting lists before an organ became 
available, roughly 18 per day (OPTN, 2003). In spite of media campaigns and other 
attempts to promote donation, the supply of organs cannot keep up with the demand, and 
the number of patients on waiting lists has been growing steadily during the last decade 
(see Figure 1). One of the most frequently quoted explanations of the gap between the 
supply and demand of organs is that the number of families that refuse to grant consent to 
donation is still large. Approximately half of the families that are approached to request 
donation refuse it in the U.S. and Great Britain, compared to around 20% in Spain and 
around 30% in France.
3 The U.S. and Great Britain are informed consent countries; Spain 
and France are presumed consent countries. 
From an economist’s point of view, the shortage of cadaveric organs for 
transplantation is an intriguing phenomenon. First, from a purely utilitarian perspective, it 
represents the routine disposal of a highly valuable commodity, with the potential to save 
                                                 
3 The figure for the U.S. comes from Nathan et al (2003) where it is taken from a variety of sources. For 
Great Britain, this information appears in Barber et al (2003), it refers to the period of April 2003 to June 
2003, and it was conveyed to us in personal communication by Phil Pocock from UK Transplant. For 
Spain, we obtained the figure from ONT (2003) for the year 2002. Finally, for France, the figure comes 
from EFG (2003); it refers to the year 2002 and to potential donors deceased from encephalic death.     3
lives. Moreover, survey data indicate a significant disagreement between preferences for 
donation and donor card registration. In particular, results from a well-known survey 
(Gallup, 1993) indicate that while most Americans favor organ donation (85%), and 
would like to donate their organs after death (69%), only a few grant permission for 
organ extraction on their driver’s license or an organ donor card (28%). Finally, in recent 
years the question of how defaults influence economic choices has become an issue of 
great interest among economists.
4  
The severe shortage of human organs for transplantation in the U.S. has prompted 
numerous proposals to alleviate this problem. In addition to presumed consent legislation, 
proposals include financial incentives for donors (Becker and Elias, 2003), 
xenotransplantation (transplantation of organs from a different species, usually pigs), 
educational campaigns, organ exchange mechanisms for living donors with incompatible 
recipients (Roth, Sonmez, and Unver, 2004), and preferential assignment of organs to 
registered donors.
5  
However, increasing donation consent rates from families is still viewed as the 
most promising route to increase organ donation (UNOS, 2002). Many analysts and 
health professionals believe that presumed consent legislation may play an important role 
in shaping the decision of the families. In an international survey of transplant 
professionals, 75% of the respondents supported presumed consent legislation, and 39% 
identified this type of legislation as the most effective measure to increase donation rates, 
                                                 
4 In a very influential study, Madrian and Shea (2001) found that for workers at a certain large U.S. 
corporation the participation rate in the firm’s 401(k) retirement plan was higher under default enrollment 
and many of the workers retained the default contribution rate and fund allocation. On the impact of 
defaults on economic behavior, see also Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Choi et al (2003) and Thaler 
and Sunstein (2003). 
5 See Oz et al (2003). In addition, Votruba (2001) has studied the efficient allocation of cadaveric organs.   4
the highest percentage among all measures considered in the survey, followed by 
improved education with 18% (Oz et al, 2003). 
Several factors, beyond legislative defaults, have been hypothesized to affect 
cadaveric donation rates in the medical literature. These factors include the level of 
wealth, religious beliefs and social norms, education, and medical infrastructure. In 
addition, most deceased donors are patients who have suffered irreversible brain injury 
resulting in brain-death, but whose heartbeats are maintained through artificial 
ventilation. The most common causes of death of these patients are traffic accidents and 
cerebro-vascular diseases. Consequently, the mortality rates for these two causes of death 
have been considered important determinants of organ donation rates.
6 
In this article, we analyze the impact of presumed consent legislation on cadaveric 
organ donation, after controlling for other factors that affect organ donation rates. An 
important consideration regarding the analysis conducted here is that the content and 
enforcement of presumed consent laws vary greatly across countries. In Austria, for 
example, presumed consent legislation is applied rigorously, and deceased individuals are 
considered potential donors in absence of explicit opposition before death, regardless of 
the will of the family. In Spain, however, as in most presumed consent countries, even 
when organ removal can be carried-out by law without the consent of the family, organ 
coordinators in charge of the donation process do not authorize the extraction of organs 
without family approval. 
Because registration is nominally free (in all countries to our knowledge) and 
because families are allowed to make the final decision on whether or not organs will be 
donated, it is not obvious that legislative defaults on cadaveric organ donation should 
                                                 
6 See Cameron and Forsythe (2001) for a further discussion of the factors which determine organ donation 
rates.   5
have an effect on donation rates. In the next section, we outline a simple model of donor 
registration and family consent that can sustain equilibria with higher donation rates in 
presumed consent countries than in informed consent countries. 
 
III. A Simple Model of Presumed Consent 
In this section, we outline a model of organ donation. Albeit simple, the model has two 
important implications: (1) even if families make the final decision on organ donation, 
presumed consent laws may result in notably higher consent and donation rates; (2) 
registration rates may be low even if registration costs are low (and even if preferences 
for donation are high in informed consent countries and low in presumed consent 
countries).  
Let  D u  and  N u  be the utility levels realized in the donation and non-donation 
states, respectively. We allow  D u  and  N u  to vary across individuals. Let  N D u u v − =  be 
the utility gain derived from donation. Individuals observe their own v’s. Families, 
however, have imperfect information about the value of v for family members. The 
information of families about v is given by the mean-preserving spread  ε + = v z , where 
ε  is independent of v and has a log-concave density.
7 The distributions of v and ε  are 
common knowledge. Individuals pay “contemplation costs” equal to c for registering as 
donors (in informed consent countries) or non-donors (in presumed consent countries).
8,  9 
For simplicity, we assume c to be fixed and known to everybody.  
                                                 
7 Log-concavity is a non-parametric regularity condition often used in information economics. Log-
concavity is satisfied by most common distributions, such as the normal, uniform, logistic, and Laplace 
distributions. See An (1998) for additional information on log-concavity. 
8Arguably, it would be more appropriate to refer to c as “registration costs” rather than “contemplation 
costs”. However, we adopt the term “contemplation costs” in accordance with the medical literature, where 
the discrepancy between donation preferences and donor registration is habitually attributed to the 
perception that donor registration is often avoided because it forces potential donors to confront the 
prospect of their own death (see, e.g., AMA, 1994).   6
This model can be represented as an extensive form game. First, individuals 
decide whether or not to register after observing v and the type of legislation. Then, 
families decide whether or not to consent to donation, after observing the type of 
legislation, the registration decision of the individuals, and the value of  z . Both potential 
donors and families choose their actions in order to maximize the expected utility of 
potential donors. Given the type of legislation, a pair of strategies in this game consists of 
two functions: the first function maps v on the registration decision of potential donors; 
the second function maps z  and the registration decision of potential donors on the 
donation consent decisions of the families. 
Equilibrium in an informed consent country. Consider a solution in which individuals 
register as donors if  I V v∈ , with  0 > v  for all  I V v∈ . Families do not override the 
decision of deceased potential donors because, conditional on registration,  0 > v .
10 For 
deceased potential donors who did not register, families evaluate  ] , | [ z v V v v E I = + ∉ ε . 
Log-concavity of ε  and independence between v and ε  guarantee that v and z  are 
affiliated random variables.
11 By the properties of affiliated random variables   
] , | [ z v V v v E I = + ∉ ε  is a non-decreasing function of z . Therefore, there exists some  I z  
such that families of non-registered potential donors comply with the informed consent 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 In this model, registration can be regarded as a costly signaling device of donation preferences from the 
individual to the family. Instead of (or in addition to) signing a donor card, some individuals may 
communicate their preferences regarding organ donation directly to their relatives before death. However, 
survey data have detected a widespread reluctance to discuss organ donation issues with family members 
(see, for example, Gallup, 1993). Given that organ donor cards lack legal status and/or are not enforced in 
most countries, we conjecture that the role that organ donor cards may play in practice is to provide a 
channel to signal donation preferences to family members and organ procurement agencies, that does not 
require engaging in an active discussion with family members about death and organ donation preferences. 
See also Bryne and Thompson (2001) on the use of registration as a signal.  
10 In reality, families’ own views on organ donation may sometimes influence consent decisions. However, 
it has been documented that families who know that their relatives wished to donate their organs after death 
overwhelmingly consent to donation (see Siminoff et al, 2001.) 
11 See Appendix A for the proof, and Krishna (2002) for more on affiliated random variables.    7
default if  I z z ≤ . For simplicity of the exposition, we will assume that  I z  is an interior 
point in the support of  z . 
Consequently, the expected utility of a non-registered potential donor in an 
informed consent country is  ) | Pr( ) | Pr( v z z u v z z u I D I N > + ≤ . The expected utility of a 
registered donor in an informed consent country is  c uD − . Therefore, an individual 
becomes a registered donor if  c v z z v I > ≤ ) | Pr( , which is consistent with the assumption 
that all the elements of  I V  are positive. Notice that registered donors are a subset of those 
individuals with  c v > . 
An equilibrium is characterized in this model by 
{ }, ) | Pr( : c v z z v v V I I > ≤ =  
for the registration decision of the individuals, and 
, 0 ] , ) | Pr( | [ = = + < ≤ I I z v c v z z v v E ε  
for the donation consent decision of the families.
12 
 
Equilibrium in a presumed consent country. Under a presumed consent default the 
analysis is analogous. Consider a solution in which individuals register as non-donors if 
P V v∈ , with  0 < v  for all  P V v∈ . Families do not override the decision of deceased 
potential donors because, conditional on registration,  0 < v . For deceased potential 
donors who did not register, families evaluate  ] , | [ z v V v v E P = + ∉ ε . Because this 
expectation is a monotonic function of  z , there exists some  P z  such that families of non-
                                                 
12 The concept of equilibrium is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. For simplicity, assume that ε  has full 
support on the real line. Then, every information set is on the equilibrium path, and Bayes’ Rule applies 
everywhere. Families update their beliefs using Bayes’ Rule, and the actions of potential donors are optimal 
given families’ strategies.   8
registered potential donors comply with the presumed consent default if  P z z ≥ . We will 
consider the case in which  P z  is an interior point in the support of  z . 
Using the same analysis as for the informed consent case, it is easy to show that 
an individual will register as a non-donor if  c v z z v P − < ≥ ) | Pr( , which is consistent with 
the assumption that all the elements of  P V  are negative. Notice that registered non-donors 
are a subset of those individuals with  c v − < . 
A solution to this problem is given by 
{ }, ) | Pr( : c v z z v v V P P − < ≥ =  
for the registration decision of the individuals, and 
, 0 ] , ) | Pr( | [ = = + − > ≥ P P z v c v z z v v E ε  
for the donation consent decision of the families. 
 
Implications of the model. It can be shown that if the density of ε  is log-concave, then, 
for any given  I z  and  P z , the sets  I V  and  P V  are either intervals or empty sets.
13  
Figure 2 shows an example of equilibrium strategies for the case when  I V  and  P V  are 
non-empty intervals in equilibrium. In an informed consent country, individuals register 
as donors if  I V v∈ , and families consent to donation if either the deceased potential 
donor registered or if  I zz > . In a presumed consent country, individuals register as non-
donors if  P V v∈ , and families consent to donation if the deceased potential donor did not 
register and  P z z ≥ .  
Consider first the implications of the model under informed consent legislation. 
Because registration generates a contemplation cost,  0 > c , and because families have 
some information about v, not all individuals with  0 > v  register as donors. Individuals 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A for the proof.   9
with positive but low v do not register because the contemplation cost is high relative to 
the utility derived from donation. Moreover, individuals with positive but low v may not 
register even if vc > , provided that the probability that  I zz >  is large enough. 
Individuals with high v may not register either, because the probability that for them 
I z z ≤  is very small. Only individuals with intermediate positive values of v, those with  
I V v∈ , will register.
14, 15 In absence of registration costs, however, all the individuals with 
0 v >  would register as donors. The combination of registration costs and the fact that 
families have additional information about the preferences for donation of family 
members reduces registration rates in informed consent countries. The same conclusion 
holds also for presumed consent countries. 
A second important implication of the model is that legislative defaults on 
cadaveric organ donations may influence family consent rates for non-registered potential 
donors. Consider the setting in which both ε  and v are symmetrically distributed with 
respect to zero. Then, it is easy to prove that  P I zz = −  and  P I VV = − . Using the fact that 
z  and v are affiliated, it can be easily seen that Pr( | ) Pr( | ) P PI I zzvV zzvV ≥∉ ≥≥∉ . 
That is, under presumed consent, family consent rates for non-registered individuals are 
equal to or larger than under informed consent. At an intuitive level, informed consent 
laws allow individuals with strong preferences for donation to separate. As a result, 
families in informed consent countries infer that non-registered individuals had weak 
preferences for donation on average, and do not consent unless the indicator z  is large. 
                                                 
14 In this sense, the model outlined in this section is related to some recent developments regarding non-
monotonic strategies in signaling models. See, e.g., Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To (2002). 
15 If the support of vis bounded, all individuals with strong preferences for donation may register in 
equilibrium. That would be the case also if individuals with strong preferences for donation derived a 
sufficiently large consumption value from registration or if they incurred sufficiently lower contemplation 
costs. For simplicity and because the substantive implications of the model are identical, we do not follow 
these potential extensions here.    10
In contrast, in presumed consent countries, individuals with strong aversion to donation 
are allowed to separate. Families in presumed consent countries infer that non-registered 
individuals had strong preferences for donation on average, and consent to donation 
unless the indicator z  is small.
16 
Higher family consent rates for non-registered potential donors in conjunction 
with low registration rates tend to generate equilibria in which presumed consent 
legislation produces higher donation rates than informed consent legislation. To see this, 
consider the following numerical example. Let v and ε  be distributed as normal 
independent variables with mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1. Let c, the 
registration cost, be equal to 0.25. It is easy to show that, for these values of the 
parameters,  4222 . 0 = I z , and  [0.5631,1.2815] I V =  define a pair of equilibrium strategies 
under informed consent legislation. Similarly,  4222 . 0 − = P z , and  [ 1.2815, P V =−  
0.5631] −  define a pair of equilibrium strategies under presumed consent legislation.
17 
For this example, registration rates are around 18% under either presumed or informed 
legislation, even when around 40% of the individuals have  c v >  (or  c v − < ). In addition, 
the 18% registration rate is much lower than the 50% rate that would arise if the model 
did not incorporate a registration cost. These equilibria generate donation rates of around 
44% under informed consent legislation and around 56% under presumed consent 
legislation, with a difference of around 12 percentage points. 
  The model described in this section shows that, as a result of a signal-extraction 
problem, presumed consent defaults may generate higher donation rates than informed 
consent defaults. However, the model is not unambiguous in this conclusion: it is 
                                                 
16 In reality of course, individuals are always able to separate by communicating preferences for donation 
directly to their families. However, if the cost of discussing organ donation with family members is high 
relative to registration costs, then the qualitative predictions of the model still apply. 
17 See Appendix A for the solution of the model under normality.  11
possible to find examples in which presumed consent laws have zero or negative effect 
on donation rates.
18 Moreover, signal-extraction is not the only channel through which 
legislative defaults may affect organ donation.
19 Ultimately, whether or not presumed 
consent laws have an effect on donation rates is an empirical issue. In the next section, 
we use data on organ donation rates, legislative defaults on cadaveric organ donation, as 
well as other factors affecting cadaveric organ donation, for a panel of countries to 
investigate the effect of presumed consent legislation on organ donation rates. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
Despite the worldwide concern about organ shortage for transplantation, few empirical 
studies have aimed to identify and measure the factors that influence donation rates. The 
reason may be, in part, that the data required to conduct these studies are not readily 
available.
20 This is particularly true concerning information on legislative defaults on 
organ donation for different countries.  
  For the empirical analysis in this section, we collected information on legislative 
defaults for a sample of 36 countries. Figure 3 shows donation rates and type of 
legislation in 2002 for the 36 countries in our sample. Presumed consent countries seem 
                                                 
18 For example, if most individuals have strong preferences for organ donation and families observe an 
uninformative indicator of donation preferences, a presumed consent law may create a separating 
equilibrium in which the few individuals with strong aversion for donation register and do not donate. In 
the same scenario, an informed consent law may create a pooling equilibrium, in which individuals with 
strong aversion to donation are not able to separate.  
19 Data from laboratory experiments and observational studies have provided evidence of the existence of a 
preference to maintain the status-quo that influences individual decision making (see, for example, 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). If a preference to comply with the status-quo exists in the context of 
organ donation, that by itself will create a direct link between legislative defaults on organ donations and 
organ donation rates. Moreover, some authors have suggested that presumed consent laws may affect the 
consent decisions of the families because they change the framing of the request of consent to the families, 
by creating a strong expectation that consent will be granted (see, for example, Cameron and Forsythe, 
2001.) 
20 As Cameron and Forsythe (2001) put it: “… the quantity of hard data on donation remains small, and 
what is available is often not readily accessible.  Neither has all the information been assembled in one 
place and correlated …”  12
to have higher donation rates than informed consent countries. However, the connection 
between legislative defaults and donation rates is not completely unequivocal.  Figure 3 
also shows that one country, Spain, has higher donation rates than any other country. This 
fact is well-documented in the medical literature, where the “Spanish model” of organ 
procurement has been studied extensively.
21 
  For 22 countries in our sample and the period 1993-2002 we obtained information 
on a number of factors that are thought to affect donation rates, such as per capita GDP, 
health expenditures per capita, religious beliefs, the legislative system, and the number of 
deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents and cerebro-vascular diseases. We assembled 
our dataset using a variety of sources, which are detailed in Appendix B.
22  
  In this section, we use regression analysis to study how presumed consent 
legislation is related to cadaveric organ donation rates, after controlling for other 
determinants of organ donation.  
  Table I shows descriptive statistics for the sample of countries used for our 
regression analysis. Column (1) shows means and standard deviations for the entire 
sample. Fifty-six percent of the observations in our sample are for presumed consent 
countries. Columns (2) and (3) show means and standard deviations for presumed 
consent and informed consent countries, respectively. The last column contains the 
                                                 
21 The Spanish national transplant organization (ONT) is considered the most effective organ procurement 
organization in the world. Several countries, including Australia and the UK have considered adopting the 
Spanish organ procurement system, often referred to as the “Spanish model”. The “Spanish model” is based 
on: (i) a system of independent transplant coordination teams, which request consent from families of 
potential donors so the burden of organ procurement is taken away from transplant surgeons and treating 
physicians; (ii) a hospital reimbursement policy, which compensates hospitals for organ procurement costs; 
and (iii) a multi-layered network at the national, regional, and hospital level, which coordinates and 
manages organ procurement activities. See Matesanz (2001) for details.     
22 To reduce heterogeneity in social norms, we restricted our sample to Western Christian countries 
(Catholic or Protestant). Appendix B describes our sample selection criteria in detail. Appendix C contains 
information on legislative defaults on organ donation rates for the 36 countries considered in Figure 3.  13
differences between columns (2) and (3), along with t-statistics for the null hypothesis of 
equality of means for presumed and informed consent countries.  
  It has been pointed out in the medical literature that donation rates are not 
markedly higher in presumed consent countries (see, e.g., Cameron and Forsythe, 2001). 
Table I shows that in our sample, informed consent countries have on average 14.19 
cadaveric donors per million population per year. Presumed consent countries have on 
average 17.29 cadaveric donors per million population per year, 3.10 more than informed 
consent countries. This difference, however, is not significant at conventional test levels. 
In addition, relative to informed consent countries, presumed consent countries have 
lower GDP per capita, and lower health expenditures per capita, although again none of 
these differences is significant at conventional levels. Presumed consent countries are 
predominantly Catholic, while informed consent laws are the rule in countries with a 
legislative system based on common law. Finally, the combined mortality rate in motor 
vehicle accidents (MVA) and cerebro-vascular diseases (CVD) is significantly higher in 
presumed consent countries.    
  Table II reports estimated coefficients for the regression of the log of cadaveric 
donation rates on an indicator of a presumed consent legislative default and other 
predictors of donation rates.
23 Column (1) shows that, on average, donation rates are 
roughly 16% higher in presumed consent countries.  However, this difference is not 
significant at conventional test levels. Some analysts have argued that the positive 
difference in donation rates between presumed and informed consent countries may be 
due to the outlier effect of Spain, which maintains presumed consent legislation. In 
column (2) we repeat the regression from column (1), this time excluding Spain from our 
                                                 
23 Standard errors are clustered at the country level. All specifications include year fixed-effects.  14
sample. As expected, the estimated coefficient on the presumed consent legislation 
indicator decreases relative to column (2) and remains statistically indistinguishable from 
zero at conventional test levels. Thus, our data support the view in the medical literature 
that donation rates in presumed consent countries are not much higher on average, 
relative to informed consent countries. 
  However, as shown in Table I, the distributions of some potential determinants of 
donation rates differ between presumed and informed consent countries. In columns (3)-
(8) of Table II, we include in the regression the other determinants of organ donation 
considered in Table I.  In columns (3) and (4) we include measures of wealth and medical 
expenditures.
24 In both cases, the coefficient on the presumed consent variable indicates 
roughly 26% higher donation rates in presumed consent countries. This difference is 
significant at conventional test levels. In columns (5)-(8) we report the results for 
regression models that include additional variables that measure potentially relevant 
country characteristics: religious beliefs, whether the country has a common law or a civil 
law system, and the number of deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents and cerebro-
vascular diseases. In all cases, including these variables in the regression does not change 
substantially the value of the coefficient on the presumed consent indicator. This is true 
even though, as shown in column (6), the variables considered in our regression models 
explain almost one-third of the variance of the dependent variable (
2 .3216 R = ). In 
column (8), we show that when other determinants of cadaveric donation rates are 
accounted for, the coefficient on the presumed consent variable is still large and 
significant even if we exclude Spain from the sample. 
                                                 
24 The two variables are highly collinear, with health expenditures representing a roughly constant 9%-10% 
fraction of GDP.  15
  On the whole, the results of Table II show that, when other determinants of 
donation rates are accounted for, presumed consent countries have roughly 25%-30% 
higher donation rates than informed consent countries. Moreover, this result is robust to 
changes in the regression specification.
25 
  A potential concern about the analysis in this section is that our results will be 
biased if unobserved determinants of cadaveric organ donation rates are correlated with 
the passage of presumed consent laws. In particular, it could be argued that countries 
where the population have a strong preference for organ donation would be inclined to 
enact presumed consent laws. In that situation, societal preferences towards organ 
donation would induce a positive association between presumed consent laws and organ 
donation rates, and the coefficient on presumed consent in our regressions would be 
biased upwards. Fixed effects estimators for panel data are often used to control for time-
invariant (additive) confounders. In our sample, legislative defaults on cadaveric organ 
donation rarely change over time. Therefore, we cannot include country fixed effects in 
our regression specifications and still identify the coefficient on the presumed consent 
variable.
26 However, the absence of time-invariant confounders can be tested in 
regressions (3) to (8) of Table II, because these regressions include time-varying 
variables whose coefficients are identified in a specification with country fixed effects. If 
country effects are correlated with the presence of presumed consent laws, the 
coefficients on all the variables in our regressions will be biased in the pooled OLS 
specification, but not in the fixed-effects specification. We use the difference in the 
                                                 
25 In addition to the results reported in Table II, we carried out a specification analysis  in which we 
considered additional variables measuring education (e.g., average years of schooling of adults) and  
medical infrastructure (e.g., number of hospitals beds per capita). In all cases, the coefficients on the added 
variables were not statistically significant and their inclusion left the presumed consent coefficient virtually 
unchanged.   
26 The only country that experiences a change of legislation in our sample is Sweden, which goes from an 
informed consent system to a presumed consent system in 1996.  16
coefficients on the time-varying regressors between the pooled OLS and the fixed-effects 
specifications to test the hypothesis that country effects are uncorrelated with the 
presence of presumed consent laws.
27 P-values are reported in Table II for regressions (3) 
to (8). Our specification test does not detect compelling evidence against the null 
hypothesis of absence of confounding country effects.  
  Although our specification test produces encouraging results about the validity of 
our estimates, it should be clear that the statistical power of our test will be low against 
deviations from the null hypothesis that affect mainly the estimated coefficient on the 
presumed consent law, but not the coefficients on the time-varying regressors. An 
alternative approach to the potential endogeneity of presumed consent laws is to include 
in our regressions a proxy for societal preferences towards organ donation. We follow 
this approach in Table III, where we use annual blood donations (per capita) as an 
indicator of societal preferences towards organ donation.
28 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 
III reproduce the specifications in columns (6) and (7) of Table II, but this time including 
the logarithm of annual blood donations per 1,000 population as an additional regressor. 
As expected, donations of blood are positively associated with donations of organs. 
However, the estimated coefficients on the presumed consent variable increase relative to 
Table II. This is at odds with the notion that nations with stronger preferences towards 
organ donation will be inclined to enact presumed consent laws. In fact, columns (3) and 
(4) of Table III show that social preferences towards organ donation proxied as the log of 
blood donations per 1,000 population have, if anything, a negative correlation with the 
presence of presumed consent laws (although the coefficients on the log of blood 
                                                 
27 This test is implemented as a generalized Hausman specification test (see White, 1996). 
28 Arguably, donations of blood are motivated by the same philanthropic considerations as organ donations. 
Other indicators of the propensity to donate, like the fraction of the population who do unpaid work for 
voluntary organizations, produced similar results.  17
donations per 1,000 population in columns (3) and (4) are not significant at conventional 
test levels). Overall, the robustness analysis reported in Table III fails to detect any 
evidence that the empirical results in Table II are confounded by cross-country 
differences in social norms towards organ donation. 
  On the whole, our empirical results suggest that presumed consent laws may 
greatly increase the supply of cadaveric organs for transplantation. However, it would be 
erroneous to interpret our results as evidence that presumed consent is the sometimes-
portrayed silver-bullet for organ shortage. First, it is unlikely that a 25% to 30% increase 
in cadaveric donation would eliminate completely the organ shortage problem in some 
countries, like the U.S., although it would help considerably to alleviate it. To see this 
assume that percentage increases in cadaveric donations translate roughly to percentage 
increases in cadaveric transplantation. Table IV in column (1) shows the range for the 
number of additional transplantations that a 25% to 30% increase in cadaveric 
transplantations would have represented in the U.S. for the period of 1995-2002. For the 
same period, columns (2) and (3) show the yearly change in the number of patients on 
waiting lists and the yearly number of deaths on the waiting list, respectively. Columns 
(4) to (6) show the same variables for the U.K. and the period 1994-2001. The figures in 
Table IV suggest that a 25% to 30% increase in cadaveric transplantation could 
potentially close the gap between the demand and the supply of organs in the U.K., but 
not in the U.S. Moreover, it seems likely that an increase in the supply of cadaveric 
organs would be followed by a reduction in the supply of organs from living donors. 
Substitution of organs from living donors would attenuate the effect of an increase in  18
cadaveric organs on the size of the waiting lists.
29 Finally, many questions remain 
unanswered about how to implement a legislative change of this type. Although recent 
studies have reported successful transitions to a presumed consent default (see, for 
example, Michielsen, 1996), it seems likely that in some countries the imposition of a 
presumed consent law, without building first sufficient social support, could generate an 




Previous studies have pointed out that, on average, presumed consent countries do not 
produce significantly higher organ donation rates. Moreover, several authors have 
hypothesized that this lack of correlation is produced by the fact that presumed consent 
laws are rarely enforced and that, in practice, family consent is always required before 
organs are extracted.  
  In this article, we argue that legislative defaults on organ donation may affect the 
consent decisions of the families, even if they are not enforced. First, we use a simple 
model to illustrate how presumed consent laws may affect organ donation rates. In 
addition, using a panel of countries, we show that, once other determinants of organ 
donation are accounted for, cadaveric donation rates are 25% to 30% higher in presumed 
consent countries. The magnitude of this estimate does not vary much across the different 
specifications of our empirical model. Furthermore, using the panel structure of our data 
we are able to reject the presence of additive fixed effects.  
                                                 
29 This substitution effect is difficult to quantify because, to our knowledge, there do not exist estimates of 
the elasticity of substitution between living donor organs and cadaveric organs. In addition, it is possible 
that a higher availability of organs would be followed by an increase in the number of referrals to the 
waiting lists.  19
  Health professionals and organ donation activists in the U.S., Great Britain, and 
several other countries have proposed changing legislative defaults on organ donation to 
presumed consent. The results of this article suggest that presumed consent laws may 
alleviate organ shortages. Further research is needed, however, to understand better how 
societies perceive and respond to legislative changes of this nature.  20
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Appendix A: Technical Details 
Affiliated random variables 
 
Lemma 1: Suppose that the density of ε  is log-concave and that ε  and v are 
independent. Let  ε + = v z . Then, z and v are affiliated, that is, for all  z z ≥  and  v v ≥  
 
), , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( , , , , v z f v z f v z f v z f v z v z v z v z ≤  
 
where  v z f ,   is the density of  ) , ( v z .  
 
Proof: Because ε  and v are independent, we obtain 
 
). ( ) ( ) , ( , v f v z f v z f v v z − = ε  
 
Therefore, z and v are affiliated if and only if 
 
). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( v z f v z f v z f v z f − − ≤ − − ε ε ε ε  
 
In other words, the density  ε f  is of Pólya frequency of order 2, which is equivalent to 
log-concavity of  ε f (see An, 1998). 
 
Lemma 2: Suppose that z v ε =+,  where ε   is independent of v and has a log-concave 
density. Let  I z,  P z ,  and c be real numbers with  0 c > . Then,  
 
{ } :P r ( |) II Vv v z z v c =≤ >   and    { } :P r ( |) PP Vv v z z vc = ≥< −  
 
are either intervals or empty sets. 
 
Proof: It can be shown that log-concave densities have convex supports (An, 1998). Let 
() ( ) I gv v F z v ε =− . Notice that  (0) 0 g = . In addition lim ( ) 0 v gv →∞ = , because log-
concave densities have at most exponential tails (An, 1998). The right-hand-side 
derivative of  () gv i s   ()() II Fz v v fz v εε −− −. Notice that  ( ) ( ) II Fz v v fz v εε − −−  
converges to one when v →− ∞, and it converges to zero when v →∞. If the support of 
ε  is bounded from below,  ( ) ( ) II Fz v v fz v εε − −−  is equal to zero if  I zv −  is to the left 
of the support of ε . If the support of ε  is bounded from above,  ( ) ( ) II Fz v v fz v εε −− − 
is equal to one if  I zv −  is to the right of the support of ε . If  I zv −  belongs to the 
support of ε ,  t h e n   ()() II Fz v v fz v εε −− − has the same sign as  ( )/ ( ) II Fzvfzv v εε −− − . 
By the properties of log-concave densities, the ratio  ( )/ ( ) II Fz v fz v εε − −  is a non-
increasing function of v. Thus, ( )/ ( ) II Fz v fz v v εε − −−  is decreasing, so the function  24
() gv is quasi-concave. Now, the result for  I V  follows from the properties of quasi-
concave functions. The proof for  P V  is analogous. 
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where Φ represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
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where φ  represents the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. 
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Hence, the solution for the cutoff point,  I z , is given by: 
 
 ()  () () ()
10
II II II I II I II
II
cz cz cz cz µµ µµ
µσ φ µ σ φ
σσ σσ
−− ⎛ − ⎞ − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ Φ− + − Φ+ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
 
For the presumed consent case, the result is analogous: 
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Appendix B: Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 
International data on cadaveric organ donation rates come from the Spanish National 
Organ Transplantation Organization (ONT, 2003) and the Transplant Procurement 
Management Organization (TPM, 2003). Disaggregated data for the U.K. and Ireland 
were provided by Kerri Burbidge from UK Transplant. Data on organ donation for the 
U.S. come from OPTN (2003). Data on organ donation rates for New Zealand come from 
ANZOD (2003). For the U.S., data on cadaveric transplantation, size of waiting lists, and 
number of deaths on waiting lists come from OPTN (2003). For the U.K., data on 
cadaveric transplantation and size of waiting lists come from UK Transplant (2003), and 
data on deaths on waiting lists was provided to us by Kerri Burbidge from UK 
Transplant. 
  Data on legislative defaults on cadaveric organ donations were compiled from a 
variety of sources by consulting the legal literature. In some instances, when legislative 
data for a particular country could not be found in the literature or the information was 
ambiguous, we contacted the country agency in charge of organ donation management to 
request this information. Detailed information about legislative defaults on cadaveric 
organ donation is presented in Appendix C. 
  We obtained data on GDP, population, health expenditures, and number of 
hospital beds from the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003a). 
Schooling data appear in the World Bank Education Statistics (World Bank, 2003b). The 
number of deaths caused by traffic accidents and cerebro-vascular failures were compiled 
from the World Health Organization Mortality Database (World Health Organization, 
2003). We obtained data on religious beliefs and legal systems from CIA (2003). Data on 
blood donation refer to the year 2001. For Europe and North America these data come  28
from FIODS (2004). Data on blood donation for New Zealand was provided by Paul 
Hayes from the New Zealand Blood Service. Data on the fraction of the population doing 
unpaid work for voluntary organizations come from the World Values Survey (Inglehart 
et al, 2004). 
  For the 36 countries listed in Appendix C and in Figure 3 and for the year 2002, 
we obtained data on cadaveric organ donation rates and legislative defaults on cadaveric 
organ donation. Fourteen of the 36 countries were discarded for the regression analysis in 
section IV. Countries were discarded for several reasons. First, to reduce heterogeneity in 
social norms we restricted our sample to Western Christian countries (Catholic and 
Protestant). This eliminated from our sample Bulgaria, Greece, Israel, Japan, Romania, 
and Turkey. Some countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Romania, were discarded also because of data availability problems. An additional 
reason to discard Japan was that heart-beating cadaveric donation was outlawed in Japan 
until recently. We also discarded small countries with less than one million population, 
like Cyprus and Luxembourg. We discarded Switzerland, because, although this country 
has an informed consent default at the federal level, legislation on organ donation 
defaults varies by region. Finally, some countries produce extremely modest levels of 
organ transplant activity, which, in some cases, may be caused by lack of transplantation 
facilities. If capacity constraints limit the transplantation activity in a country at a very 
low level, legislative defaults are unlikely to influence donation rates, because organs will 
not be used for transplantation. Including in our sample countries with capacity 
constraints on organ transplantation would bias down our estimate of the effect of 
presumed consent laws in countries where capacity constraints are not binding. For this 
reason, we discarded those countries which never reached a rate of 20 kidney transplants  29
per million population per year. These countries are: Croatia, Greece, Slovak Republic, 
Romania, and Turkey. In principle, this could create a bias in our estimates if the cause of 
low transplant rates in those countries is a low cadaveric organ donation rate. However, 
we chose the rate of kidney transplants to select our sample because kidneys can be 
procured from living donors if transplant facilities are available. In practice, capacity, and 
not cadaveric donation, is likely to be the binding constraint for countries with fewer than 
20 kidney transplants per million population per year. In the U.S., for example, 
transplants of kidneys procured from living donors routinely surpass the 20 pmp rate. In 
Cyprus, where cadaveric donations are almost non-existent, the rate of kidney transplants 
from living donors goes consistently beyond the 55 pmp mark. 
  The 22 countries used in our regression analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  30
Appendix C: Legislative Defaults on Cadaveric Organ Donation 
 
Australia: Informed consent country by Law of 1982. Has a donor registry since 
November 2000. 
 
Austria: Presumed consent country by Law of 1 June 1982, Section 62A. Has a non-
donor registry since 1995. The principle of presumed consent is enforced. 
 
Belgium: Presumed consent country by Law of 13 June 1986. Has a combined registry 
since 1987. Families should be informed and could potentially object to organ donation.  
 
Bulgaria: Presumed consent country by Law of 1996. In practice, consent from the next 
of kin is required. 
 
Canada: Informed consent country by Uniform Human Tissue Donation Act of 1980.  
(The exact date depends on each state: Alberta: Human Tissue Act 1967. British 
Columbia: Human Tissue Gift Act 1974. Manitoba: Human Tissue Gift Act 1987. New 
Brunswick: Human Tissue Gift Act 1973 and Human Tissue Gift Act 1986. 
Newfoundland: Act No 78 of 1966. Nova Scotia: Human Tissue Gift Act 1964. Ontario: 
Human Tissue Gift Act 1982. Prince Edward Island: Human Tissue Donation Act 1992 
Quebec:  Civil Law of 1993 Articles 42,43, 44.) 
 
Croatia: Presumed consent country by Law of 2000; was already a presumed consent 
country since 1989. No donor registry in place. Family consent is always requested. 
 
Cyprus: Presumed consent country by Law No 97 of 1987. 
 
Czech Republic: Presumed consent country by Law of 1984. A new law was passed on 
September 2002 that established a stronger version of presumed consent. No registry in 
place for non-donors. 
 
Denmark: Informed consent country by Law No 402v of 13 June 1990. Previously, 
Denmark was a presumed consent country by Law No 246 of 9 June 1967. Denmark has 
a combined registry since 1990. 
 
Estonia: Presumed consent country. 
 
Finland: Presumed consent country by Law No 355 of 26 April 1985 and Ordinance No 
724 of 23 August 1985. 
 
France: Presumed consent country by Caillavet Law (No 76-1181) of 22 December 1976 
and the Bioethics Law No 94-654 of 29 July 1994. France has a non-donor registry since 
1990, as well as a donor card system. In practice, families can override the intent of 
deceased relatives. 
  31
Germany: Informed Consent country by Act on the Donation, Removal and 
Transplantation of Organs of 5 November 1997. Previously, Germany was also informed 
consent. There is no registry in place. 
 
Greece: Presumed consent country by Law 2737 of August 27 1999. It was already a 
presumed consent country by Law of 1978 (No 821) modified in 1983 (Law No 1383 of 
the 2 August 1983). 
 
Hungary: Presumed consent country by Ordinance No 18 of 4 November 1972. Has a 
non-donor registry since 1999. 
 
Ireland: Informed consent country. The Republic of Ireland does not have a law 
regulating organ donation, but follows U.K. guidelines. 
 
Israel: Presumed consent country by the Law of Anatomy and Pathology of 1953. 
 
Italy: Presumed consent country by Penal Code, Articles 581-5 and Law No 458 of 26 
June 1967, Law No 644 of 2 December 1975. A new law of presumed consent was 
approved on April 1st 1999. Has a combined registry since 2000. In practice, families are 
consulted before organs are extracted. 
 
Japan: Informed consent country by Law No 104 of 16 July 1997. Before 1997, heart 
beating donors were not allowed. According to section 6(1) of the Law of 16 July 1997, 
families can veto decisions of relatives to donate. 
 
Latvia: Presumed consent country.  
 
Lithuania: Informed consent country. 
 
Luxemburg: Presumed consent country by Law of 25 November 1982. 
 
The Netherlands: Informed consent country by Law of 24 May 1996. Before 1996, the 
country was already informed consent. There is a combined registry in place since 1998. 
Families decide on donation for non-registered relatives, but have a small influence in the 
decision for registered relatives. 
 
New Zealand: Informed consent country by the Human Tissue Act of 1964. 
 
Norway: Presumed consent country by Law No 6 of 9 February 1973. There is no 
registry in place. Families are consulted before organ extraction and can potentially 
refuse. If no relatives are found, organs can be extracted. Patients organizations have 
introduced donor cards, but they do not have legal status. 
 
Poland: Presumed consent country by Article No 91-408 of August 30 1990 law and 
article 4 of October 1995 law. There is a non-donor registry in place since 1996.  
 
Portugal: Presumed consent country by Law No 12 of 22 April 1993. There is a non- 
donor registry in place since 1994.  32
 
Romania: Informed consent country by Law of 1998. Previously, Romania was already 
an informed consent. There is a combined registry in place since 1996. 
 
Slovak Republic: Presumed consent country by Law of 24 August 1994, section 47.  
 
Slovenia: Presumed consent country by Law of 2000. Previously, Slovenia was already 
presumed consent, by the Law of Transplantation of Human’s Body Parts of 1996. 
 
Spain: Presumed consent country by Law No 30 of 30 October 1979. In practice, organs 
are extracted only with the consent of families. 
 
Sweden: Presumed consent country by Law of 1996. Between 1987 and 1996, Sweden 
was an Informed Consent country. Families can potentially veto donation if the wishes of 
the deceased relative are not known. There is a combined registry in place, although it is 
used mainly as a non-donor registry. 
 
Switzerland: Informed consent country by Federal Order of 22 March 1996. However, 
the country is divided in cantons that have their own legislation. The following cantons 
have presumed consent legislation: Appenzell (laws of 1974 and 1992), Argovie (1987), 
Bale-Campagne (1988), Bale-Ville (1981), Berne (1984), Geneva (1996), Grisons (1984), 
Lucerne (1981), Neuchatel (1995), Nidwald (1981), St-Gall (1979), Turgovia (1985), 
Valais (1996), Vaud (1985), and Zurich (1991). 
 
Turkey: Presumed consent country by Law No 2238 of  June 3, 1979. In practice, written 
authorization from families has to be obtained before organ extraction. 
 
United Kingdom: Informed consent country by The Human Tissue Act 1961 and the  
The Human Organ Transplants Act 1989. Has a donor registry since 1994. 
 
United States: Informed consent country by National Organ Transplants Act of 1984.  
There are donor registries in 14 states; donor registries are being considered in other 
states. 
 










































































































































































































































































Table I – Descriptive Statistics 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
 
 















      
Presumed consent country  .5634 
[.4971] 
   




















Health expenditures per 






































      
Number of countries  22 13 10   
Number of observations  213 120  93   
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. The number of 
countries with informed and presumed consent laws do not sum to the total number of countries in the sample 
because one of the countries in the sample (Sweden) changed legislation during the sample period.  
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  











Table II – The Effect of Presumed Consent Legislation on Cadaveric Organ Donation 
(Pooled OLS, 1993-2002) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of cadaveric donors per million population 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Legislation:          






















Wealth & health expenditures: 















Log of health 
expenditures per capita 
    .2061
* 
(.1175) 
    
Religious beliefs: 


















Log of MVA & CVD 
deaths (per 1000 pop.) 










           
          
Include  Spain  yes no yes yes yes yes yes no 
Specification test 
      (p-value) 
    .9504 .3876 .9074 .2230 .2340 .3863 
R-squared  .0587 .0342 .2111 .2124 .2754 .3216 .3111 .3636 
Number of observations  213 203 213 186 213 146 146 140 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of cadaveric donation rates, per million population 
per year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
within-country. All specifications include year fixed-effects. The table reports p-values for the null 
hypothesis of absence of correlated fixed effects.  
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  
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 Table III – Presumed Consent and Social Preferences 
(Pooled OLS, 1993-2002) 
 
 
 Dependent  variable: 
Natural log of cadaveric donors pmp 
  Dependent variable: 
Presumed consent country 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
         
Variables from Table II, columns (6) and (7):        






    









Catholic country  .1328 
(.1589) 
















Log of MVA & CVD 









Social preferences:      
Log of blood donations 










         
R-squared  .3705  .3494  .6497  .5881 
Notes: All specifications include year fixed-effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
country level. The number of observations in all specifications is 139.   
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.  






Table IV – Organ Shortage and Potential Increase in Transplantation 
 
 
  USA   UK 




















  (1) (2)  (3)    (4) (5)  (6) 
             
1994         [668,  802]  221  513 
1995  [3,947, 4,736]  5,969  3,514    [695, 834]  372  533 
1996  [3,949, 4,738]  6,067  4,015    [645, 773]  275  569 
1997  [4,011, 4,814]  6,230  4,498    [644, 773]  184  555 
1998  [4,191, 5,030]  6,858  5,192    [597, 716]  45  578 
1999  [4,203, 5,043]  5,888  6,516    [597, 716]  169  545 
2000  [4,270, 5,124]  6,703  6,144    [584, 700]  103  494 
2001  [4,340, 5,208]  5,580  6,665    [585, 702]  63  433 
2002 [4,484,  5,380]  2,163  6,679        
Notes: Columns (1) and (4) show 25% and 30% percentages of cadaveric transplantations for each particular year 
and for the U.S. and the U.K., respectively. Columns (2) and (5) show the yearly change in the number of patients 
on organs waiting lists for the U.S. and the U.K., respectively. Columns (3) and (6) show the number of deaths on 
the organs waiting lists for the U.S. and the U.K., respectively. 
 
 
 
 